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Abstract
This article is part of a larger project to analyse the rarely-considered gender aspects of the crime
of aggression and to explore whether or not the amendments adding the crime of aggression to the
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) represent an advancement for women. This
piece focuses on the potential for the new provisions to chill bona ﬁde exercises of humanitarian intervention given that (1) the crime is expansively drafted to potentially cover all uses of
sovereign force, (2) delegates rejected eﬀorts by the United States to include an express exception
for military operations launched to prevent the commission of other crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, and (3) other proposals that would have prevented humanitarian interventions
from being considered ‘acts of aggression’ were not fully explored or implemented. The article
acknowledges that feminist theory may never fully come to terms with a notion of humanitarian
intervention given the doctrine’s valorisation of militarism, especially in light of the fact that women
are so often excluded from decisions about uses of force. It nonetheless argues that if
we want to hold out the possibility of humanitarian intervention being deployed in defence of
women, elements of the new provisions (such as the terms ‘manifest’, ‘character’, ‘gravity’, and
‘consequences’) should be interpreted to exclude situations involving the nascent responsibility to
protect doctrine.
Keywords
international criminal law; International Criminal Court (ICC); women; crime of aggression;
national sovereignty; humanitarian intervention; just war

1. Introduction
Any feminist defence of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention must take as
its starting point the recognition that the substantial denial of women’s rights –
whether civil, political, economic, social, or cultural – has never served as the
*) The author served as the Academic Advisor to the U.S. delegation for the ICC Review Conference
in Kampala, Uganda. The views expressed herein are her own. The author is grateful for the feedback of all the participants in the Conference on Women and International Criminal Law cohosted by IntLawGrrls and the American Society of International Law and especially the generous
comments of Diane Marie Amann, Margaret deGuzman, and Jaya Ramji-Nogales.
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sole or primary basis for military intervention.1 Advocating the deployment of
humanitarian intervention on behalf of women requires an acceptance of the
legitimacy, if not lawfulness, of the use of armed force without Security Council
approval.2 This, in turn, requires a coming to terms with a certain valorisation of
militarism and its inherent masculinities – a perspective that is alien to much
feminist thinking. Nonetheless, while women remain under the threat of mass
violence, we should not foreclose ongoing eﬀorts to develop a workable doctrine
of humanitarian intervention to prevent the commission of grave crimes that are
subject to prosecution before the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the
event of Security Council political paralysis or inaction.
If we hold out the possibility that humanitarian intervention might someday
be deployed to protect women from the ravages of war and gender-based violence, we should be concerned about the threat of over-deterrence posed by the
new provisions on the crime of aggression3 recently added to the ICC Statute.4
The crime of aggression is expansively drafted in a way that implicates all uses of
force that might be construed to constitute a ‘manifest’ violation of the U.N.
Charter. Whereas the concept of self-defence has a Charter basis5 and is relatively
well established under international law, the right to use force in defence of others
is more contested. As a result, the codiﬁcation of the crime of aggression and the
eventual threat of prosecution may chill those uses of force that are protective in
nature, such as interventions pursuant to the nascent doctrine of responsibility to

1)

See Christine Chinkin, ‘A Gendered Perspective to the International Use of Force’, 12
Australian Year Book of International Law (1988-89) 290 (“Oppression and acts of brutality
towards women have never been regarded in the same light as slavery, genocide and apartheid”);
see also ibid., p. 291 (“The invisibility of women in any legal justiﬁcations for the use of force is
striking.”).
2)
See Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conﬂict, International
Response, Lessons Learned (Oxford University press, Oxford, 2000) p. 4, <www.reliefweb.int/library/
documents/thekosovoreport.htm>, 17 February 2011 (“The Commission concludes that the
NATO military intervention was illegal, but legitimate.”).
3)
This article is part of a larger project to analyse the rarely-considered gender aspects of the crime
of aggression and to explore whether or not the amendments to the ICC Statute represent an
advancement for women. See also Beth Van Schaack, ‘The Grass That Gets Trampled When
Elephants Fight: Will the Codiﬁcation of the Crime of Aggression Protect Women?’, 15 UCLA
Journal of International Law & Foreign Aﬀairs (2011) __ (forthcoming).
4)
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 36(8), 1 July 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter ICC Statute]. The aggression amendments, which will not take eﬀect until completion
of a ratiﬁcation process, are the result of a Review Conference held in 2010 in Kampala, Uganda.
For a discussion of the negotiations surrounding the crime of aggression, see the IntLawGrrls series
on aggression, <intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/search/label/Crime%20of%20aggression%20series>,
and the Kampala Conference, <intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/search/label/Kampala%20ICC%20
series>. See also Beth Van Schaack, ‘Negotiating at the Interface of Power & Law: The Crime of
Aggression’, 49 Colorado Journal of Transnational Law (2011) __ (forthcoming), available at
<papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1668661>.
5)
U.N. Charter, Art. 51.
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protect.6 Such uses of force do not directly implicate sovereign prerogatives in the
way that other uses of force of questionable legality – such as acts of pre-emptive/
preventative self-defence or military responses to acts of terrorism – might. For
this reason, humanitarian uses of force may be more susceptible to processes of
deterrence. The potential for over-deterrence should be a concern for those of us
working to enhance the ability of international law to improve women’s lives and
protect them from abuse.
With the drafting process behind us, whether or not the Court will hear aggression cases involving humanitarian interventions now depends on the attitudes of
members of the Assembly of States Parties and the Security Council – which are
empowered to refer situations to the Court – as well as the discretion of the
Prosecutor. During the aggression negotiations, the United States delegation
endeavoured to create a space in the deﬁnition of aggression to argue the legality
of bona ﬁde humanitarian interventions.7 The most pointed proposals of the
United States were ultimately not implemented. There is language, however, in
the ﬁnal resolution adopting the aggression amendments that should be interpreted by these actors to exempt bona ﬁde humanitarian interventions from prosecution as the crime of aggression.

6)

See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility
to Protect (International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, 2001) p. 69 (explaining that
“the responsibility to protect its people from killing and other grave harm was the most basic and
fundamental of all the responsibilities that sovereignty imposes—and that if a state cannot or will
not protect its people from such harm, then coercive intervention for human protection purposes,
including ultimately military intervention, by others in the international community may be warranted in extreme cases”.); 2005 World Summit Outcome, U.N. General Assembly Resolution 60/1
(U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1) para. 138, (24 October 2005); U.N. Security Council Resolution
1674 (U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674) para. 4, (28 April 2006) (containing a reaﬃrmation by the
Security Council that “the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit
Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”). But see Chair of the High-Level Panel
on Threats, Challenges & Change, Transmittal Letter from the Chair of the High-Level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change addressed to the Secretary-General (U.N. Doc. A/59/565) para. 203,
(2 December 2004) (envisioning the responsibility to protect doctrine as limited to action by the
Security Council).
7)
This position reﬂected themes from President Obama’s Nobel acceptance speech:
More and more, we all confront diﬃcult questions about how to prevent the slaughter of civilians by their own government, or to stop a civil war whose violence and suﬀering can engulf
an entire region. I believe that force can be justiﬁed on humanitarian grounds, as it was in the
Balkans, or in other places that have been scarred by war. Inaction tears at our conscience and
can lead to more costly intervention later.
See Barack H. Obama, Nobel Lecture by Barack H. Obama: A Just and Lasting Peace, 10 December
2009, <nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/obama-lecture_en.html>.
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2. Deconstructing the Crime of Aggression
References to sex and gender pervade the Statute of the International Criminal
Court (ICC), not only in its substantive law, but also in its structures and procedures. In particular, the ICC Statute contains an expansive list of gender crimes in
the war crimes and crimes against humanity provisions.8 Persecution on the basis
of gender – along with ethnicity or race – is penalized.9 The deﬁnition of genocide in Article 6 mirrors that of the Genocide Convention, but the Elements of
Crimes – drafted to assist the ICC in interpreting its substantive oﬀenses – note
that “serious bodily or mental harm” “may include, but is not necessarily restricted
to, acts of torture, rape, sexual violence or inhuman or degrading treatment”.10 In
terms of personnel, the ICC Statute requires states parties to choose judges and
other staﬀ with experience with “violence against women or children”11 and calls
for “fair representation of female and male judges”.12 The ICC Statute also contains a non-discrimination provision stating that the ICC’s application and interpretation of the law must be consistent with internationally recognised human
rights and be without adverse distinction founded on, inter alia, gender.13
These provisions in the ICC Statute are the result of the intense and coordinated advocacy work of a coalition of women’s groups, then called the Women’s
Caucus for Gender Justice, which was active during the drafting of the ICC
Statute.14 To achieve these provisions, the Caucus had to overcome signiﬁcant
resistance from a handful of states and non-governmental delegations – including
the Holy See, several anti-choice organizations, and a core of Islamic states – that
were less sympathetic to the imperative of gender justice.15 Though gender played
8)
Articles 8(2)(b)(xxii) and 8(2)(e)(vi) of the ICC Statute speciﬁcally designate the crimes of rape,
sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation, and other forms of
sexual violence as war crimes whether committed in international or non-international armed conﬂict. The same crimes are listed as crimes against humanity. ICC Statute, supra note 4, Art. 7(1)(g).
Enslavement as a crime against humanity is also deﬁned with reference to the traﬃcking of women
and children. Ibid., Art. 7(2)(c).
9)
Ibid., Art. 7(1)(h).
10)
International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes (U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2) p. 2,
n.3 (2000).
11)
ICC Statute, supra note 4, Arts. 36(8)(b) (Judges), 42(9) (Oﬃce of the Prosecution), and 43(6)
(Victims and Witnesses Unit).
12)
Ibid., Art. 36(8)(a)(iii).
13)
Ibid., Art. 21(3).
14)
For a discussion of the contributions of the Caucus and other feminist organisations, see Barbara
Bedont and Katherine Hall-Martinez, ‘Ending Impunity for Gender Crimes under the International
Criminal Court’, 6 Brown Journal of World Aﬀairs (1999) 65. The Caucus, reorganised in 2004 as
the Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice, is now focused on monitoring the Court’s implementation of the gender provisions of the ICC Statute and channeling the concerns of women in the
regions in which the ICC is working. See <www.iccwomen.org/>.
15)
See Janet Halley, ‘Rape at Rome: Feminist Interventions in the Criminalization of Sex-Related
Violence in Positive International Criminal Law’, 30 Michigan Journal of International Law (2008)
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a central role in the negotiations surrounding other aspects of the ICC Statute,
there was no mention of gender in the recent negotiations to add the crime of
aggression to the ICC Statute and little involvement by non-governmental organisations focused on advancing the interests of women worldwide. Instead, the
negotiations were dominated by states with sovereign agendas as varied as alternatively preserving or eroding the power of the Security Council in international
relations.16
As a result of the recently-concluded negotiations, the crime of aggression has
been deﬁned as follows:
Article 8 bis
Crime of aggression
1. For the purpose of this Statute, “crime of aggression” means the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position eﬀectively to exercise control over or to
direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character,
gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, “act of aggression” means the use of armed force by a
State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in accordance with United Nations General
Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, qualify as an act of aggression.17

The deﬁnition then provides a list of “acts of aggression” (such as invasion, bombardment etc.) drawn verbatim from Article 3 of General Assembly Resolution
3314, the instrument that was meant to guide the Security Council in exercising
its U.N. Charter-based duties to respond to breaches of the peace and acts of
aggression. The amendments thus deﬁne two phenomena – a crime of aggression,
set out in subsection 1 of the Article, and an act of aggression, set out in subsection 2. These two inquiries will generally be considered in reverse order such
that the act of aggression committed by a state serves as a predicate for the prosecution of an individual for the crime of aggression. Thus, an individual will be
held liable for the crime of aggression only when he or she plans, prepares, initiates, or executes one or more acts of aggression through the machinery of a state.
Only those acts of aggression that by their “character, gravity and scale” constitute

1 (discussing role of activists in negotiations to ensure the ability to prosecute sex crimes within the
statutes of the international criminal law tribunals).
16)
See Beth Van Schaack, ‘Negotiating at the Interface of Power & Law: The Crime of Aggression’,
49 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (2011) __ (forthcoming) (discussing the negotiating
dynamics at the Kampala Review Conference where the amendments were adopted).
17)
Rev. Conf. of the Rome Statute, 13th plenary meeting (I.C.C. Doc. RC/Res. 6) (advance version)
(11 June 2010), <www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf> [hereinafter
Resolution RC/Res.6].
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a “manifest violation” of the Charter, viewed objectively, can give rise to the crime
of aggression.
Needless to say, it would be a singular achievement if the codiﬁcation and
prosecution of the crime of aggression were able to reduce the incidence of conﬂict in the world and give real content to the ‘right to peace’ that would improve
the lives of so many women.18 And yet, there is a risk that codiﬁcation of the
crime of aggression may result in more ex post prosecutions of leaders launching
aggressive campaigns at the expense of ex ante eﬀorts to halt threatened or ongoing violence.19 A number of elements of the aggression amendments implicate the
concept of humanitarian intervention – a fact not lost on delegates during the
negotiations. Delegates could have framed the deﬁnition to more expressly leave
open a space for exempting humanitarian intervention from prosecution. But
very few such proposals were seriously considered, let alone adopted. Most
importantly, delegates rebuﬀed several eﬀorts by the United States to explicitly
preserve a right to engage in truly humanitarian intervention and instead favoured
more implicit language to this eﬀect. The result is that the various organs of the
Court will enjoy considerable discretion in dealing with such scenarios.20

3. Exempting Humanitarian Interventions
Once it began participating in the negotiations in November 2009, the United
States took the position that the deﬁnition of aggression under consideration was
ﬂawed and that the apparent consensus on the elements of the crime masked
signiﬁcant disagreements regarding what types of sovereign conduct could constitute the crime of aggression. By the time of the Kampala Review Conference, it
was clear that delegates were loath to reopen negotiations over the deﬁnition,
especially at the behest of a latecomer. As a result, the U.S. delegation endeavoured to address perceived problems through a series of ‘Understandings’ to preserve an opening for claims about the legality of humanitarian interventions and

18)

See U.N. General Assembly Resolution 33/73, Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life
in Peace, (U.N. Doc. A/RES/33/73) (Dec. 15, 1978); Philip Alston, ‘Peace as a Human Right’, in
Richard Pierre Claude and Burns H. Weston (eds.), Human Rights in the World Community, (1980)
p. 198.
19)
Kenneth Anderson, ‘The Rise of International Criminal Law: Intended and Unintended
Consequences’, 20 European Journal of International Law (2009) 333 (noting how international
criminal law has emerged as an alternative to intervention). The International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, for example, has been criticised for being a consolidation prize in lieu of a
more robust military response to atrocities.
20)
The early negotiation history is available in Stefan Barriga, et al., The Princeton Process on the
Crime of Aggression: Materials of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, 2003-2009,
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2009).

0001286957,INDD_PG2766

482 5/4/2011 10:29:25 AM

B. Van Schaack / International Criminal Law Review 11 (2011) 477–493

483

other arguably legitimate, yet potentially unlawful, uses of force.21 The ability of
the United States to advocate this position was complicated by its central role in
orchestrating two military interventions laying claim to the humanitarian mantle: Kosovo in 1999 and Iraq in 2003.
The United States’ eﬀort to make explicit reference to a right of humanitarian
intervention in the Understandings failed when delegates rejected the following
proposed language:
It is understood that, for purposes of the Statute, an act cannot be considered to be a manifest
violation of the United Nations Charter unless it would be objectively evident to any State
conducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal practice and in good faith, and thus
an act undertaken in connection with an eﬀort to prevent the commission of any of the crimes
contained in Articles 6, 7 or 8 of the Statute would not constitute an act of aggression.

As an alternative, the United States sought other interpretive language focused on
gravity and purpose to more indirectly preserve the ability of states to engage in
humanitarian interventions.
3.1. Resolution 3314
One angle was to tether the deﬁnition of aggression more closely to Resolution
3314, adopted by the General Assembly by consensus in 1974.22 Although supporters of the current deﬁnition touted its Resolution 3314 pedigree, the amendments depart from that instrument in subtle yet signiﬁcant ways. Most
importantly, both Resolution 3314 and the U.N. Charter23 envision a continuum
of unlawful uses of force, only some of which rise to the level of aggression. The
ICC deﬁnition, by contrast, is susceptible to a reading that every violation of
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter as well as violations of a state’s “sovereignty” is
21)
Harold H. Koh, Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State, made the following intervention
in Kampala:

Although we respect the considerable eﬀort that has gone into the Princeton Process [the
intersessional aggression negotiations], we believe that without agreed-upon understandings,
the current draft deﬁnition remains ﬂawed. We are concerned that the apparent consensus on
the wording of Article 8bis masks sharp disagreement on particular points regarding the
meaning of that language that must be addressed before the amendments on the crime of
aggression can enter into force.
Harold H. Koh, Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State Statement at the Review Conference
of the International Criminal Court (4 June 2010), <www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/142665
.htm>.
22)
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31 (U.N.
Doc. A/9631) 142-43 (1974).
23)
Article 39 of the U.N. Charter describes three prohibited uses of force: “threat[s] to the peace,
breach[es] of the peace, or act[s] of aggression.” U.N. Charter, art. 39.
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an “act of aggression”. Echoing language from Resolution 3314’s preamble, the
United States managed to attain a formal Understanding to the eﬀect that “It is
understood that aggression is the most serious and dangerous form of the illegal
use of force . . .”.24 In addition, the United States successfully advocated the adoption of an Understanding that reads:
[A] determination whether an act of aggression has been committed requires consideration of
all the circumstances of each particular case, including the gravity of the acts concerned and
their consequences, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

3.2. Identifying a “Manifest” Violation of the U.N. Charter
Only those acts of aggression that constitute a “manifest” violation of the U.N.
Charter will give rise to a prosecution for the crime of aggression. The term “manifest” in Article 8(1), which was never deﬁned, emerged as a compromise term
that bridged the positions of two sets of delegates. One camp wanted no threshold at all. This position was premised on the theory either that every act of aggression should be subject to prosecution, or that only “the most serious crimes of
international concern” would be prosecuted before the ICC.25 In the other camp
were delegates that sought a higher threshold to limit prosecutions to “ﬂagrant”
breaches of the U.N. Charter, wars of aggression, “unlawful” uses of force, or acts
of aggression geared toward occupying or annexing territory. Any one of these
qualiﬁers – with the exception perhaps of “ﬂagrant” – might have made it less
likely that individuals engaged in bona ﬁde humanitarian interventions would be
prosecuted for the crime of aggression.
The United States succeeded in raising the threshold on the term “manifest”
slightly with an Understanding that states:
It is understood that in establishing whether an act of aggression constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the three components of character, gravity and scale
must be suﬃcient to justify a “manifest” determination. No one component can be signiﬁcant
enough to satisfy the manifest standard by itself.

Given the degree of variation in states’ preferences, the term “manifest” remains
ambiguous: to some, the word refers to the degree of legal clarity surrounding the
state’s conduct; to others, the word denotes some level of seriousness (in terms of
the impugned act’s scale or consequences) or wilfulness. The focus on “consequences” in the Understandings allows for an opening to argue that a military
operation that may have violated Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter as a technical
matter might not be deemed to constitute an act of aggression by virtue of the
24)
25)

All the understandings appear in Annex II of Resolution RC/Res.6, supra note 17.
ICC Statute, supra note 4, Art. 1.
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fact that it ultimately improved the situation on the ground by protecting civilians and vulnerable groups from further attack.

4. Purpose and Intent
One avenue for creating an opening for humanitarian interventions that was not
fully explored would have been to tinker with the mens rea element of the crime
of aggression with respect to the deﬁnition of the “crime of aggression”.26 As it
stands, the deﬁnition of “crime of aggression” contains a combination intention/
knowledge-of-fact formulation: the defendant must intend to commit an enumerated act of aggression and must have knowledge of the factual circumstances
that render the act a manifest violation of the Charter (e.g., the absence of Security
Council authorisation or the absence of a prior attack by the putative victim
state). The defendant need not, however, have knowledge of the applicable legal
doctrine concerning the use of force. If drafters in Kampala had followed reasoning from some Nuremberg-era jurisprudence27 and required proof of a heightened mental state implying some illicit purpose behind the actions – such as a
speciﬁc intent or motive element or some showing of bad faith, malice, wilfulness, or hostile intent – they might have provided a textual basis for distinguishing bona ﬁde from pretextual humanitarian interventions.28
In the alternative, delegates could have added some notion of motive or intentionality to the deﬁnition of the state act of aggression, bearing in mind the difﬁculty of attributing an ‘intention’ to an artiﬁcial entity like a state. For example,
the United States suggested that the Court be directed to consider the state’s
“purpose” for using force when determining whether an act of aggression had
been committed, which would have provided a potential opening to argue for the
legality of humanitarian interventions. Alternatively, along the lines of a prior but
abandoned German proposal, “act of aggression” could have been deﬁned with
reference to the wilfulness or hostile intent behind a governmental policy. In the
26)
See Elise Leclerc-Gagné and Michael Byers, ‘A Question of Intent: The Crime of Aggression
and Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention’, 41 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law
(2009) 379.
27)
In the High Command Case, the tribunal stated that the lawful or unlawful character of a war
turns on its purpose: “Whether a war be lawful, or aggressive and therefore unlawful under international law, is and can be determined only from a consideration of factors that entered into its
initiation. In the intent and purpose for which it is planned, prepared, initiated, and waged is
to be found its lawfulness or unlawfulness.” United States v. Von Leeb (The High Command Case),
11 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law
No. 10 (1949) pp. 462, 486.
28)
See Andreas L. Paulus, ‘Peace through Justice? The Future of the Crime of Aggression in a Time
of Crisis’, 50 Wayne Law Review (2004) 27 (noting requirement under German law that the defendant must possess the speciﬁc intent to disturb the peaceful coexistence of peoples).
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alternative, the deﬁnition could have listed a series of prohibited purposes, such
as conquest, establishing a military occupation in the victim state, launching a
war of aggression, achieving the annexation of the other state’s territory, acquiring
the other state’s material resources, undermining the political independence of
the state, or violating a state’s neutrality. None of these proposals was adopted,
and so the purpose behind a particular use of armed force can be considered only
with reference to the terms character, gravity, and scale.

5. Character, Gravity and Scale
Under the provisions ultimately adopted, the only way for any party to address
potentially unlawful but nonetheless legitimate uses of force is with reference to
the tripartite factors of character, gravity, and scale. Drafters did not consider how
these factors should be deﬁned, leaving it to the Court for interpretation. Both
gravity and scale, while not entirely synonymous, refer to the severity, magnitude,
and consequences of a particular use of force. Indeed, both scale and character are
arguably components of gravity that cannot really be assessed independently. The
term “character”, as a more qualitative term, is the most elastic of the three factors
and might provide an opening to argue that an act of aggression was not committed with hostile intent or for aggressive purposes.

6. Particularised Defences
Finally, delegates could also have subjected the crime of aggression to special justiﬁcations or excuses. Negotiators did not, however, seriously consider amending
the ICC Statute provisions addressing available defences. As it stands, individual
defendants under indictment for the crime of aggression can invoke all of the
existing defences – subject to whatever adaptations are necessary – set out in the
ICC Statute. In particular, Article 31(1) provides that a defendant may be exonerated if he is acting in self-defence, in the defence of others, or under duress.
Subparagraph (1)(c) – the only provision that implicates the crime of aggression
directly – states: “The fact that the person was involved in a defensive operation
conducted by forces shall not in itself constitute a ground for excluding criminal
responsibility under this subparagraph”. Thus, neither self-defence nor the
defence of others is automatically proven in situations in which the defendant is
acting on behalf of a state engaged in self-defence, presumably within the terms
of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.29 Delegates could have added a provision to
29)

This provision states: “The fact that the person was involved in a defensive operation conducted
by forces shall not in itself constitute a ground for excluding criminal responsibility under this
subparagraph”.
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allow more clearly for a consideration of whether the state’s use of force was motivated by the defence of others. Article 31 is addressed to individual defences and
does not easily accommodate ‘defences’ that might be raised by the putative
aggressor state at the stage in the proceedings at which the state act of aggression
is under consideration. Indeed, it is unclear procedurally whether either the
impugned state or the putative victim state will have standing to participate in
the aggression determination absent amendment to the ICC Statute or Rules of
Procedure.30

7. Chilling Humanitarian Intervention in Theory and Practice
It remains to be seen whether and how the adopted Understandings will impact
on the travaux préparatoires or inﬂuence prosecutions before the Court in light of
their uncertain legal authority.31 Some delegations supported the content or
impulse behind the rejected Understandings, but deemed them unnecessary or
superﬂuous; others expressed concerns as to their very content. Many were sympathetic to the idea that humanitarian interventions should not be prosecuted as
the crime of aggression, but preferred to grant the Court discretion in this regard.
Given this ambiguous record, it will be for the various organs and constituencies
of the ICC – including the Prosecutor exercising prosecutorial discretion and the
Pre-Trial Division ﬁlter – to determine how to address future humanitarian interventions. By virtue of this delegation of interpretive authority, the ICC is thus
poised to play a role as arbiter on the legality of humanitarian interventions. The
variety of meanings of the term ‘manifest’ coupled with the nuances contained in
the Understandings provide tentative grounds for bona ﬁde humanitarian interventions to avoid scrutiny by the Court under the rubric of the crime of
aggression.
Nonetheless, because the crime is expansively and ambiguously deﬁned, the
potential exists for the new aggression provisions to chill arguably beneﬁcent uses
of force that lack Security Council approval, such as: multilateral, regional, or unilateral peacekeeping missions and humanitarian interventions; rescue operations;

30)
See Beth Van Schaack, ‘Question on the ICC Aggression Filter’, IntLawGrrls, 24 July 2010,
<intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/2010/07/question-on-icc-aggression-ﬁlter.html>, (discussing lack of
standing of states during the aggression determination); See International Criminal Court, Rules of
Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court (U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1)
(2000).
31)
See Kevin Jon Heller, ‘Are the Understandings Valid?’, Opinio Juris, <opiniojuris.org/2010/06/16/
are-the-aggression-understandings-valid/>, (arguing that the seven understandings adopted at
the review conference should be ignored by the judges); Kevin Jon Heller, ‘Marko Milanovic on
Understandings’, Opinio Juris, <opiniojuris.org/2010/06/16/marko-milanovic-on-understand
ings/>, (arguing that the Court must consider the understandings as part of the interpretive framework for the treaty).
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or even (more controversially) military responses to acts of terrorism that might
incapacitate terrorist organisations and prevent future attacks. Humanitarian
interventions may be more susceptible to being chilled than other uses of force of
ambiguous legality. Bona ﬁde humanitarian interventions are discretionary and
often do not directly implicate sovereign prerogatives as do actions compelled by
an extension of a right of self-defence. The risk of chilling the exercise of such an
‘imperfect duty’, if it can even be called that, is thus greater.32 Indeed, even in the
face of a horriﬁc genocide, the international community found a host of excuses
for not intervening more robustly in Rwanda. The codiﬁcation of a crime of
aggression without any humanitarian exception provides one more excuse for
inaction in the face of atrocities. To be sure, creating a penal forum to judge uses
of force may discourage states from undertaking pre-textual humanitarian interventions. At the same time, the way in which the crime of aggression as been
codiﬁed might also derail creative thinking geared toward establishing universal
standards and designing institutions to manage interventions and protect against
abuses.33 The international community must continue its work on the responsibility to protect doctrine with an eye toward establishing standards that the Court
can employ in making the predicate aggression determination in the face of arguably humanitarian uses of force.

8. Intervening on Behalf of Women
For those of us concerned about augmenting international law’s ability to protect
women, should we care about over-deterring humanitarian interventions and
other uses of force that do not constitute an a hostile attack or rise to the level of
aggressive war? It is unlikely that feminist thinkers will ever universally come to
terms with the idea of a just war.34 To be sure, many feminists have fought for
more robust forms of intervention in conﬂict zones where women were at risk.35
These calls intensiﬁed when the Taliban began imposing a form of gender apartheid in Afghanistan.36 It took the attacks of September 11th, however, for the
32)

See Gary Banham, Kant's Practical Philosophy: From Critique to Doctrine (Palgrave Macmillan,
2006) pp. 186-198 (discussing Kant’s notion of an imperfect duty).
33)
See Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane, ‘The Preventive Use of Force: A Cosmopolitan
Institutional Proposal’, 18 Ethics & International Aﬀairs (2004) 1 (proposing the establishment of a
council of democratic states to vet proposed interventions).
34)
Of course, the feminist perspective on many areas of law is neither static nor monolithic; rather,
it is multifaceted and is constantly evolving. See Lucinda Peach, ‘An Alternative to Paciﬁsm?
Feminism and Just-War Theory’, 9 Hypatia (1994) 152.
35)
See Catharine A. MacKinnon, ‘Women’s September 11th: Rethinking the International Law of
Conﬂict’, 47 Harvard International Law Journal (2006) 1.
36)
See, e.g., Feminist Majority Foundation, Stop Gender Apartheid in Afghanistan, <www
.helpafghanwomen.com/Global_Petition_Flyer.pdf>.
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United States to mobilise Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Although
the plight of women under the Taliban was not a prime motivator for the intervention, the rhetoric surrounding the intervention appropriated feminist concerns about the quality of women’s lives under Taliban rule to garner the support
of domestic and international constituencies for the Operation.37 Indeed, the
propaganda value of violence against women has long been recognised.38 To date,
preventing harm to women has served only as a convenient makeweight argument in the service of interventions initiated for other rationales.39
To be sure, interventions have been launched or considered in situations that
have featured grave violations of women’s rights. That said, interventions that did
go forward have not necessarily beneﬁted women across the board. It is now clear
that women in Afghanistan have not necessarily fared better following the partial
ouster of the Taliban.40 Nor were the women of Kuwait liberated along with their
country by Operation Desert Storm.41 Even in Kosovo, where NATO’s intervention halted an ethnic cleansing, the introduction of foreign troops occasioned a
dramatic increase in sex traﬃcking and forced prostitution.42

37)

Ann Russo, ‘The Feminist Majority Foundations Campaign to Stop Gender Apartheid:
Intersections of Feminism and Imperialism in the United States’, 8 International Feminist Journal of
Politics (2006) 557, <www2.hawaii.edu/~dasgupta/RussoFMF.pdf>, (arguing that the Feminist
Majority Foundation was complicit in the Bush Administration’s appropriation of feminist ideas to
justify interventions).
38)
Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape (Fawcett Books, New York, 1975)
pp. 40-48.
39)
The plight of women has also been employed to justify keeping troops in Afghanistan. See Aryn
Baker, ‘What Happens If We Leave Afghanistan’, TIME, 9 August 2010. The magazine has been
criticised for cynically using violence against women as propaganda in support of the continued
engagement in Afghanistan and presenting a falsely dichotomous dilemma—women remain safe if
the foreign troops stay on or women are left to be mutilated if the troops leave. See Derrick
Crow, ‘TIME’s Epic Distortion of the Plight of Women in Afghanistan’, Rethinking Afghanistan,
31 July 2010, <rethinkafghanistan.com/blog/2010/07/times-epic-distortion-of-the-plight-of
-women-in-afghanistan/>.
40)
See Human Rights Watch, ‘The “Ten-Dollar Talib” and Women’s Rights’, 13 July 2010, pp. 6,
21, <www.hrw.org/sites/default/ﬁles/reports/afghanistan0710webwcover.pdf>, (arguing that “far
from ensuring that the rights of women are respected, the current Afghan government has regularly
sold them short” and that women have few opportunities to assert their rights in today’s Afghanistan
because “powerful factions in the government and parliament … are opposed to many of the rights
and freedoms that women now enjoy.”).
41)
See Amnesty International, ‘Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries: Women Deserve
Dignity and Respect’, <www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=DAC1E87CECCA7C1780256F
CE00586B83&lang=e>. Women in Iraq remained subjugated as well. See Foreign & Commonwealth
Oﬃce, ‘Saddam Hussein: Crimes and Human Rights Abuses’, November 2002, pp. 8-9, <image
.guardian.co.uk/sys-ﬁles/Guardian/documents/2002/12/02/hrdossierenglish.pdf>,
(detailing
abuses against women after the ﬁrst Gulf War).
42)
Samantha Godec, ‘Between Rhetoric and Reality: Exploring the Impact of Military Humanitarian
Intervention Upon Sexual Violence – Post-Conﬂict Sex Traﬃcking in Kosovo’, 92 International
Review of the Red Cross (2010) 245-247.
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Many strains of feminism – whether based on an aﬃrmative essentialism borne
of biological reductionism or premised on theories of diﬀerential socialisation
and social constructivism – are closely tied to paciﬁsm in rejecting the masculinist
impulse to resort to arms in the face of conﬂict.43 The temptation to invoke
armed intervention in the face of atrocities may limit the ability of the international community to imagine, design, and implement other non-violent forms of
conﬂict resolution.44 While ostensibly protective, humanitarian interventions
threaten more violence, at least in the short term (if not longer).45 Such operations valorise militarism and entail the deployment of armed force capable of
causing great destruction, injuring civilians, and devastating societies. Doing so
in the name of humanitarianism or even in the defence of women does not negate
the harm caused to civilians who become collateral damage or are violently displaced. The idea of humanitarian intervention in defence of women also furthers
the vulnerable victim narrative by portraying women as in need of a heroic male
saviour.46 That said, anyone who is the innocent victim of violence deserves to be
rescued from her predicament, and encouraging women to exercise their autonomy and agency is simply folly when they are looking down the barrel of a gun.47
43)

Betty Reardon, Sexism and the War System (1985) (portraying women as inherently peaceful and
anti-militaristic); Mary Caprioli, ‘Gendered Conﬂict’, 37 Journal of Peace Research (2000) 51 (positing with data that domestic gender equality has a pacifying eﬀect on state foreign policy decisions).
But see Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Are Women Peaceful? Reﬂections on the Role of Women in PeaceBuilding’, 16 Feminist Legal Studies (2008) 347, 349, 359 (citing authorities that challenge the link
between feminism and paciﬁsm); Carolyn M. Stephenson, ‘Feminism, Paciﬁsm, Nationalism,
and the United Nations Decade for Women’, 5 Women's Studies International Forum (1982) 5-6
(critiquing the determinative linkage between women and peace).
44)
See Strategic Objective E.3, Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Fourth World Conference
on Women, (U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20) (1995) and (A/CONF.177/20/Add.1) (15 September
1995) (calling on the international community to “[p]romote non-violent forms of conﬂict resolution and reduce the incidence of human rights abuse in conﬂict situations.”); Sara Ruddick,
Maternal Thinking Towards a Politics of Peace (1995) pp. 141-159; ibid., xviii-xx (discussing potential for nonviolent action in the face of atrocities).
45)
Karen Engle, ‘“Calling in the Troops”: The Uneasy Relationship Among Women’s Rights,
Human Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention’, 20 Harvard Human Rights Journal (2007) 189
(“I am uneasy with the idea that destroying life and infrastructure is a way to demonstrate concern for a particular place or situation, especially when most of history has shown that such
intervention—regardless of motivation—rarely improves the lives of the individuals who are the
stated subjects of intervention.”).
46)
Godec, supra note 42 (arguing that “saving women” narratives “are regressive for women’s
rights.”). This attitude appears in an orientalist or neo-colonialist form where western troops are
portrayed as rescuing women from barbaric practices. See Faiza Hirji, The War for Women's Freedom:
Orientalist Imaginaries of Rescue in Afghanistan (2005), <www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa
_research_citation/0/1/4/7/9/p14796_index.html>.
47)
Christine M. Chinkin, ‘Kosovo: A “Good” or “Bad” War?’, 93 American Journal of International
Law (1999) 843 (observing, “How can I, as an advocate of human rights, resist the assertion of a
moral imperative on states to intervene in the internal aﬀairs of another state where there is evidence of ethnic cleansing, rape and other forms of systematic and widespread abuse, regardless of
what the Charter mandates about the use of force and its allocation of competence?”).
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Despite these concerns with part practice, it is possible to envision a beneﬁcial
humanitarian intervention on behalf of women. Ancient48 and modern just war
theories suggest some elements that would be required for any valid intervention.49 Factors often mentioned include: action by a legitimate authority; pursuit
of a right intention (the advancement of good or the avoidance of evil); abuses
that exceed some gravity threshold; the use of force as a last resort after eﬀorts at
diplomacy, negotiation and other sanctions had failed; a proportional response;
and a reasonable prospect of success. In terms of legitimate power, a prioritising
of Security Council action, or at a minimum multilateral or regional action, is a
central feature of modern theorising about humanitarian intervention. And yet,
uncertainties surrounding the deﬁnition of the crime of aggression, coupled with
the checkerboard jurisdictional regime, will no doubt impede coalition-building,
adherence to military alliances, and other multilateral responses to global threats.
The unequal threat of prosecution among states may give rise to diﬀerential tolerances for the degree of uncertainty inherent to the reach of the aggression amendments. The concomitant diﬃculty in mobilising joint action may paradoxically
lead to more unilateral actions by states not subject to the aggression amendments50 or the moderating eﬀects of joint action. Thus, the existence of the crime
on the books may ultimately make multilateral action more diﬃcult.
An additional requirement would be that such an intervention would result in
the diminution rather than escalation of violence. Although humanitarian interventions involve armed force, one can surmise that parties engaged in just wars
might ultimately produce less collateral damage than those engaged in aggressive
wars due to the fact that combatants and their commanders are likely to assign
diﬀerent values to the variables employed in the proportionality calculus (military
utility and the risk of collateral harm) than their hostile adversaries. These variables are elastic by design and provide a certain degree of latitude to combatants
to implement military strategy. Arguably, those involved in non-hostile uses of
force might demand a greater degree of military necessity to justify a course of
conduct or tolerate less potential for collateral harm in choosing their targets.51
Indeed, at the risk of melding the jus in bello and the jus ad bellum, an argument
could be made that combatants engaged in a humanitarian intervention should

48)

See Larry May, et al., The Morality of War: Classical and Contemporary Readings (Perason, 2006)
110 (compiling just war theories through the ages).
49)
See ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, supra note 6.
50)
The nationals of non-party states and states that opt out of the aggression provisions cannot be
prosecuted for the crime. Resolution RC/Res.6, supra note 17, Art. 15bis(4)-(5).
51)
But see Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, <www.icty.org/x/ﬁle/About/OTP/otp_report
_nato_bombing_en.pdf>, (discussing potential war crimes committed during Kosovo intervention,
but declining to go forward with prosecutions).
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be subject to heightened duties under humanitarian law in light of their ulterior
protective purposes.52
It is diﬃcult to construct a feminist framework for humanitarian intervention
on behalf of women under contemporary conditions, when women are so often
excluded from decisions about uses of force.53 Humanitarian intervention may be
more palatable to feminists, and ultimately more beneﬁcial to women, when
women are included in decision-making surrounding the propriety of military
intervention,54 as opposed to other responses,55 as well as in the design and implementation of such operations.56 Security Council Resolution 1325 – the ﬁrst
thematic resolution on women, peace and security – recognised the potential for
women to be peacemakers and reaﬃrmed the importance of their “equal participation and full involvement in all eﬀorts for the maintenance and promotion of
peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with
regard to conﬂict prevention and resolution”.57 Resolution 1820, which supplements 1325, focuses on sexual violence and signals the Council’s “readiness” to
“adopt appropriate steps to address widespread or systemic sexual violence”.
These landmark resolutions indicate that such abuses fall within the Council’s
jurisdiction as threats to international peace and security58 and have the potential
to surpass any gravity threshold required for humanitarian action. The resolutions thus provide a theoretical platform with a Security Council imprimatur to
integrate women and women’s groups into decision-making about the propriety
and execution of humanitarian intervention.59 That said, empirical evidence suggests that Resolution 1325 has exerted only a modest impact on peace processes

52)

Ruti Teitel, ‘The Wages of Just War’, 39 Cornell International Law Journal (2006) 695.
Chinkin, supra note 1, p. 279 (“The reality of who is making those decisions [on behalf of the
state] and the eﬀect of those decisions upon individuals within States may well take on a diﬀerent
perspective when examined from a gendered viewpoint.”).
54)
Helen Stacy, ‘Humanitarian Intervention and Relational Sovereignty’, in Stephen Lee (ed.),
Intervention, Terrorism, and Torture (2006), <www.stanford.edu/group/sjir/7.1.06_stacy.html>,
(arguing that the consensus of at-risk citizens should be assured before any intervention is launched).
55)
Christine Chinkin, Peace Agreements as a Means for Promoting Gender Equality and Ensuring
Participation of Women, United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women Expert Group
Meeting (13 November 2003) p. 10, <www.peacewomen.org/assets/ﬁle/Resources/Academic/Part
_PeaceAgrmentsGndrEqual_ChinkinLSE_2003.pdf> (noting that the “[f ]ailure to include [women’s] views and ideas can lead to an impoverished understanding of peace and security that focuses
on militarism and power supported by force.”).
56)
Peach, supra note 34 (noting that women are absent from legal and ethical inquiries about war).
57)
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325 (U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325) p. 1 (31 October 2000).
58)
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1820 (U.N. Doc. S/RES/1820) para. 1 (19 June 2008).
A subsequent resolution noted the perennial under-representation of women in formal peace
processes notwithstanding the mandate for women’s greater inclusion set forth in Resolution 1325.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1960 (U.N. Doc. S/RES/1960) p. 1 (19 June 2008).
59)
See Alain-Guy Tachou-Sipowo, ‘The Security Council on Women in War: Between Peacebuilding
and Humanitarian Protection’, 92 International Review of the Red Cross (2010) 197.
53)
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to date and that much remains to be done to fully integrate women into decision
making about how to manage armed conﬂicts.60

9. Conclusion
If we care about what happens to women in war, we should do everything in our
power to decrease the incidence of war in the ﬁrst place. It is too early to tell
whether the inclusion of the crime of aggression in the ICC Statute will be able
to do this. Once again, we ﬁnd ourselves in a reactive posture asking the ‘woman
question’, which entails exploring the gender implications of the law61 and engaging in a continuing task of determining how legal doctrines and institutions –
which women played little hand in constructing – aﬀect women.62 It is possible
at this stage, however, to anticipate the impact that the new provisions may have
on the nascent doctrine of responsibility to protect. This article should not be
read as a ringing endorsement of humanitarian intervention, as we must remain
vigilant about “the dark sides of virtue”.63 The codiﬁcation of a broad crime of
aggression, with few openings to argue for the legality or legitimacy of uses of
force for humanitarian purposes, certainly complicates this vital process of doctrinal development. Nonetheless, exigent threats to women’s rights remain. This
sad truth justiﬁes our continual work toward developing a normative and procedural framework that will allow bona ﬁde humanitarian interventions to proceed
without threat of prosecution for the crime of aggression.

60)

See Christine Bell and Catherine O’Rourke, ‘Peace Agreements or Pieces of Paper? The Impact
of the UNSC Resolution 1325 on Peace Processes and Their Agreements’, 59 International and
Comparative Law Quarterly (2010) 941 (noting a slight increase in references to women in peace
processes since the passage of Resolution 1325, especially in situations in which the United Nations
is involved).
61)
See Katharine T. Bartlett, ‘Feminist Legal Methods’, 103 Harvard Law Review (1990) 829, 836,
837 (advocating that feminists ask “the woman question” both to “expose how the substance of law
may silently and without justiﬁcation submerge the perspectives of women and other excluded
groups” and to “identify the gender implications of rules and practices which might otherwise
appear to be neutral or objective.”).
62)
Doris Buss, ‘Is International Criminal Law Feminist?’, in Cecilia M. Bailliet (ed.), The Creation
of International Law: An Exploration of Normative Innovation, Contextual Application, and
Interpretation in a Time of Flux (2010) (“When faced with an existing institutional apparatus . . .
feminist advocates often do not have the luxury of opting out. The realm of legal and political work
for feminists has, to a degree, already been deﬁned.”). See also, in this special issue, Doris Buss, ‘Is
International Criminal Law Feminist?’, (11)3 International Criminal Law Review (2011) 409-423.
63)
David Kennedy, The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism (Princeton
University Press, Priceton, 2004).
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